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SUMMARY
TV /T ANY plans have been suggested for the benefit of agri- 
■*-*-*■ culture during the past 10 or 15 years. Some of these 
have contained features that would be very beneficial to Iowa 
farmers. Some have contained defects. It is likely that further 
plans will be proposed in the future. It would be desirable for 
each farmer, in considering these proposals, to have before 
him a sort of check list or score card setting forth the most 
important requirements which a plan should meet in order to 
be beneficial to farmers and to society in general.
The following list is suggested as covering some of the most 
important requirements:
1. No plan should be favored which would yield an imme­
diate benefit merely by borrowing from the future, except 
when this results in increases of future production greater 
than the future cost.
2. Such a plan should promise a net gain to American Agri­
culture as a whole as well as to farmers in specific areas 
involved. -
3. The plan must not conflict with the farm er’s effort to 
raise the combination of products most advantageous in 
his area.
4. The plan must not be such as to set in action elsewhere 
forces which will nullify its effects.
5. The plan should not retard desirable economic shifts 
already under way.
6. To be practicable the plan must be simple and free from 
details not essential to its success. It should require a 
minimum of supervision once it is put into effect.
7. The plan should utilize rather than oppose private initia­
tive.
8. The plan should give regard to the conservation of our 
natural resources.
9. It would be preferable to develop a separate plan for each 
area confronted by a distinct set of critical problems; also 
such a plan should be confined to the respective areas for 
which it was formulated.
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10. The plan should involve the minimum of social cost and 
should uproot the smallest possible proportion of the 
population.
11. The plan must be as free as possible from political in­
fluences.
12. The plan should provide either for its own termination or 
for an orderly means of modification.
4
Bulletin, Vol. 27 [1933], No. 316, Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletin/vol27/iss316/1
Prospects for Agricultural Recovery
VII. Requirements for Economic Plans Affecting 
Agriculture
B y  JOHN A . HOPKINS, JR.
The general public is almost continuously discussing various 
plans for the control or encouragement of agriculture or some 
other industry. Unfortunately, the ordinary person is likely to 
form an opinion on the basis of whatever small group of con­
siderations may occur to him at the time. These considerations 
may be incomplete. It is certain that farmers and others would 
profit by examining all sides to such proposals before they 
approve or disapprove of them. For this purpose a sort of 
score card or check list of some of the more important require­
ments or criteria which should be met by any economic plan 
might be helpful.
It is, emphatically, not the purpose of this discussion either 
to favor or to disapprove of any particular plan. The following 
criteria are suggested simply as indicating some of the require­
ments which should be met by any permanent plan for the 
benefit of _ agriculture. This list of considerations is by no 
means complete, but it suggests in a general way some of the 
most important points on which some previous plans have 
proven defective. It should be remembered that a serious short­
coming with regard to any one of these points may not only 
cause failure in the practical application of the plan but may 
also cause serious losses to social groups outside the sphere 
of the plan itself.
On the other hand, it should not be thought that a program 
should meet each of these requirements perfectly in order to 
be adopted. Adoption is justified when there is a probability 
that gains from the plan will outweigh any incidental losses. 
If there is to be state or national planning, conflicts of interests 
should be faced; and the choices made should be those which 
will promote the general well-being most. Before any plan is 
adopted, the greatest possible number of its probable conse-
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quences, direct and indirect, should be taken under careful I 
consideration. Adoption should follow only when it is fairly 
clear that the bepefits to the nation as a whole will be sure to 
exceed the disadvantages.
In its general objective, such a plan must promise an ulti- > 
mate net gain to society as a whole. This requirement includes 
all the others. There is no clear evidence that one social group 
is of more importance to society as a whole than any other 
group of equal number. The net gain to society as a whole 
should be promised with a high degree of probability. As more 
specific but subordinate requirements the following 12 points J 
may serve as guidés.
1. No plan should be favored which would yield an immediate 
benefit merely by borrowing from the future, except when this 
results in incréases of future production greater than future 
cost. '
A somewhat larger aggregate of future payments than of j
present benefits is justified for the relief of acute distress. J
This may be regarded as the insurance principle working in 
reverse as far as the time element is concerned. That is, the 
benefit is received for the relief of distress in the present while 
the payments which correspond to insurance premiums are 
made in the future.
At the present time, large borrowings are clearly justified } 
in order to start the normal operation of the economic machine. > 
Losses from the paralysis of acute business depression are 
enormous, and large sums may justifiably be spent in putting 
men back to-work in their usual occupations and in stimulating 
new productive enterprises. When wisely spent, such loans \
may increase productivity in the future by more than their !
costs so that they represent a prudent investment as well as 
a means of relieving present distress.
On the other hand, persons or industries often obtain ex­
cessive and unproductive loans even from private lenders. 
These give us an example of the wrong kind of borrowing |
from the future. In such cases future productivity is not in- |
creased by as much as the cost of the loan. Present benefits J
are therefore obtained at a cost of still greater hardship 
in the future. I  The same principle also holds for relief ap-
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propriations distributed in the form of loans to an industry 
operating at a disadvantage. The only difference is that, in 
the case of governmental appropriations,..the burden is more 
widely diffused so that, often, individuals may not realize the 
causes of the higher taxes.
Proposals for large borrowings for. .current relief should be 
scrutinized very carefully. It should be remembered that the 
group consciousness is not so acute as that of the individual. 
Demands for present relief generally come from groups of 
persons whose attention is fixed on the benefit that they hope 
to receive immediately. But the bill is generally borne by the 
public at large and at some future date. The debt payment 
per person by the public is pretty sure to be less than the 
amount received per person benefited. No individual tax­
payer, therefore, has as great an interest in opposing an ap­
propriation as each prospective beneficiary has in demanding 
it. Also the fact that the principal payments are deferred to 
some later date still further lessens the probability that ex­
cessive present appropriations will be opposed effectively.
Another example of borrowing from the future is illustrated 
by the experience of the Federal Farm Board. In an effort 
to support the price of wheat in late 1930 and early 1931, it 
bought over 300 million bushels of wheat. It  was true that this 
kept the price of wheat in the United States above the world 
price level as long as the Board (or rather its agency, the 
Grain Stabilization Corporation) continued to buy. But as 
soon as buying stopped, the price fell to its normal position 
with regard to world prices. Also there is no doubt that the 
disposal of this wheat helped the price to move to still lower 
levels when it was sold during the following 2 years.1
A somewhat similar example is seen in the valorization, or 
control of price of Brazilian coffee. At various times the 
Brazilian Government, or that of the state of Sao Paulo, at­
tempted to stabilize or increase the price of coffee by buying 
up part of excessive carry-overs. In three instances this 
appears to have worked with -a reasonable degree of satis­
faction, since stnall subsequent crops or increases in demand
)For a more complete description of the Farm  Board experience in 
this connection see Appendix A.
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permitted disposal of the coffee at relatively small losses or 
no loss at all. In the most recent cases, in the late 1920’s, a 
growing supply made satisfactory disposal of the carry-over 
impossible, and a large proportion of it was actually de­
stroyed.2
In both of these cases the market was supported temporarily. 
But the ultimate result was a protracted and even more serious 
depression of price until the carry-over was disposed of.
2. Such a plan should promise a net gain to American Agri­
culture as a whole as well as to farmers in specific areas 
involved.
Before presenting a plan for the benefit of farmers in a 
limited area it should be made reasonably sure that the method 
suggested does not injure farmers elsewhere to an equal or 
greater extent. New England dairymen are heavy purchasers 
of feed grains from the Middlewest. It would, therefore, be to 
their advantage to keep the prices of these feeds at a low level. 
This would lower the costs of producing dairy products and 
permit the sale of a larger volume of output. At the same 
time the low prices of grains would involve a distinct loss to 
the Corn Belt farm operator as well as to the landlords whose 
income depends on the prices of these grains.
It is not true that a plan for benefit of one area should 
never be approved if it involves any loss whatever to other 
areas. But it may be said that any plan is unsound unless 
the loss is definitely exceeded by gains elsewhere. If, for in- 
« stance, it were found advisable, for soil conservation or for
some other reason, to encourage an increase in pasture acreage 
in the Corn Belt, this would result in an increase in the num­
ber of cattle raised. Increasing the total cattle production of 
the country would lead to a smaller income to range cattle 
producers. These later would have a just claim to indemnity 
for their losses. The advantage of the plan could not be 
measured simply in terms of gains to Corn Belt farmers. The 
net gain would be equal to increased income to the Corn Belt 
minus idemnity payments to ranchers, costs of administration 
and losses incurred elsewhere.
2For a more complete description of the Brazilian Coffee Valoriza­
tion see Appendix B.
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The restriction of. immigration is a case in which the pop­
ulation of the country as a whole gains contrary to the interest 
of small groups. In some industries, and even in a few agri­
cultural groups, there is a demand for a large supply of cheap 
and unskilled labor. The immigration restrictions, however, 
have tended to keep wages at a higher level. There is little 
doubt that whatever losses may have been incurred by the 
interests demanding low wages have been more than offset by 
the tendency of these restrictions to support a higher wage 
level and a higher standard of living to the great mass of 
American laborers.
The tariff on sugar, on the other hand, is a case in which 
the gain to an industry is much less than the loss to the 
country. Tariff protection to the cane and beet sugar producers 
results in increased incomes to these groups, although not to 
an amount equal to the total tariff per pound. It is estimated 
that the duty on sugar in 1930 increased the cost of sugar to 
United States consumers by $268,000,000.3 Of this increase in 
prices, approximately $50,000,000 were paid by American 
farmers on the sugar they purchased for consumption.
Of the increase in cost to consumers $115,000,000 went to the 
treasury as revenue. Of the remainder, $53,500,000 was re­
ceived as increased prices by American sugar industries. This 
amount was divided up in unknown proportions among the 
farmers raising beets or sugar cane and the owners of beet or 
cane sugar factories. Of the total of over 6 millions of Amer­
ican farmers, 2.3 percent raised sugar cane or sugar beets. But 
many of these produced other crops besides sugar. The in­
come from sugar crops amounted to only .83 of 1 percent of 
the total estimated income to farmers. But all farmers as well 
as urban consumers paid higher prices for their sugar.
3. The plan must not conflict with the farmer’s effort to raise 
the combination of products most advantageous in his area.
It is of material benefit to society at large that each area 
be permitted to produce those goods that can be produced at
3The estimates on “The Tariff on Sugar” are from the publication by 
that title by Lippert S. Ellis, published by the Rawleigh Foundation 
1933. See Appendix C for Mr. Ellis’ estimates.-
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the greatest advantage in that area. This is known as the 
principle of comparative advantage. When not interfered with 
by artificial regulation, the producers of each area tend to 
utilize their resources in the production of those commodities 
from which they will realize a maximum return for the re­
sources used. With the proceeds from these products they 
purchase other commodities which they need but which they 
could produce only at a relative disadvantage.4
The greatest benefit is not obtained by specialization in a 
single crop in each community, but rather by a combination 
of enterprises which is built up around one, or a small number 
of products. Whatever plan or regulations would prevent the 
farmer from utilizing this most advantageous combination of 
enterprises is to be regarded as undesirable.
When it becomes desirable to reduce the production, for 
instance of corn, the reduction should be smaller in the regions 
where corn is at an advantage. This would permit specification 
to continue in areas where most is to be gained by it. I f  a cut 
in production is called for, it should be of goods produced at 
the least advantage in the area concerned.
4. The plan must not be such as to set in action elsewhere 
forces which will nullify its effects.
A plan should not set in action forces which will later aggre- 
vate the situation, no matter how favorable the immediate 
consequences may appear.
During a period of industrial activity it might be possible 
to reduce the output of overexpanded agricultural enterprises 
by helping a relatively small number of farmers who were 
making unsatisfactory incomes, to find more remunerative 
openings in other industries. Reducing the labor supply in the 
overcrowded branch of agriculture would permit the remain­
ing farmers to earn a more satisfactory return. Such relief 
for some other industries is hoped for ultimately from the sub­
sistence homestead developments.
From an economic viewpoint, a defect in a plan aimed at 
reduction of output would be serious if it left the excess 
population on the farms where it could again increase pro­
duction as soon as prices showed signs of recovery. The plan
4See Appendx D.
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should not be such as to stimulate the too rapid adoption of 
production methods which would yield a greater ultimate out­
put on land permitted to remain in use. Care should be taken 
that the plan does not stimulate production of the article con­
cerned on farms or in parts of the country to which it did 
not apply.
Such defects in the plan may come from too great an at­
tempted restriction of output, or it might come from the per­
sons who administer the plan leading producers to expect 
prices higher than the prevailing levels of costs. Where there 
are such effects* it may generally be concluded that the re­
striction plan was not needed in the first place.
If yields on the remaining acreages are materially increased 
by the application of more fertilizer or more labor per acre, 
it could safely be concluded that too many acres have been 
taken out of production. In most cases it would be cheaper 
to get the needed production by using more of the available 
acreage of land than by intensifying production on an arti­
ficially restricted acreage.
Some exception may be needed in the case of increased yields 
from more timely tillage, when more thorough work is made 
possible by relieving seasonal labor peaks. Exception should 
also be made when the reduction in acreage permits establish­
ment of a more desirable crop rotation. This may decrease 
output immediately but be more productive in the long run. 
These increases in yield are sound and should not be prevented 
because they tend to reduce the costs per unit of production. 
This, in turn, offsets part of the price declines from the higher 
yields.
The Stevenson Rubber Control Plan gives us an excellent 
example of a plan for restriction which set in operation forces 
leading shortly to an actual increase. In this case a restriction 
in exports of crude rubber from British rubber-producing 
sections resulted temporarily in a sharp rise in price. But 
this, in turn, led to heavier production in Dutch possessions 
and to heavier, plantings of new trees in several widely sep­
arated parts of the world. These new trees have increased 
production up to the present time, even in the British pos­
sessions.
11
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Because of increases in rubber production, the British pro­
portion of the world rubber crop declined from 67 percent 
when the plan was put into effect to 57 percent when it was 
abandoned 6 years later. Meantime consumers learned to use 
rubber more economically. On top of this, unforseen changes 
occurred in the demand, and after a couple of years, con­
sumption increased to a level where no restriction was needed. 
An account of this interesting experiment is given in Appendix 
E. It illustrates some of the nullifying forces which may be 
set into action by an improperly considered restriction plan. 
Also it calls to attention, forcefully, the complexity of the 
economic system into which such a plan must be fitted.
5. The plan should not retard desirable economic shifts 
already under way.
When benefits to producers are paid on the basis of amounts 
of a crop raised currently, there is a tendency for farmers 
who were already reducing their acreage to stop the reduction 
or actually to increase. This occurs whether the area concerned 
is at an advantage or not. Regulations that make it difficult 
to shift to enterprises of greater comparative advantage should 
be regarded as socially undesirable.
In some sections of the eastern United States low prices of 
wheat and inability to use large capacity machinery on rough 
land have resulted in a decline in wheat acreages over a period 
of some years. The shift has been mostly into more forage 
and pasturage for dairy production. As far as the general 
farm organization in this area is concerned, it would be pref­
erable to pay benefits to increase pasturage or roughage crops 
rather than to reduce wheat. This would simply stimulate an 
advantageous movement already under way. Benefits paid to 
reduce wheat to a certain percentage of existing acreages have 
a tendency to limit reduction at this point. This is particularly 
true if the contracts with farmers stipulate that a certain 
minimum acreage should be raised. The magnitude of some of 
these shifts is illustrated in Appendix F.
A single-commodity plan for shifting production leaves to 
the farmer a wide range of 'alternative uses to which his land 
might be put. He can be depended on to make those adjust-
12
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an individual. In some cases this may not be in the best in­
terest of society as a whole. But the burden of proof would 
seem to be on the persons who formulate the plan if they seek 
to restrict the individual’s use of his resources.
A plan which seeks to change the general system of farming 
followed may be more effective than the individual-commodity 
approach. But, because of its greater rigidity, it involves a 
heavier responsibility for the authority which formulates and 
administers the plan.
In drawing up or passing upon any plan for the control of 
agriculture, it is highly important that the greatest possible 
flexibility be maintained within the cropping system and the 
livestock system recommended. For instance the control might 
be limited to the cropping system, and the livestock system 
left up to the individual farmer. Even within the cropping 
system it would be desirable to permit as much flexibility as 
possible on all points not essential to success of the plan. 
There are often desirable variations in crops used for the same 
purpose as between areas or in the same area between dry 
or wet years. These should be left to the farmer, who is on 
the ground and is able to take prompt advantage of unusual 
situations to an extent that would be impossible for any 
central administrative authority.
6. To be practicable the plan must be simple and free from 
details not essential to its success. It should require a mini­
mum of supervision once it is put into effect.
This point is concerned with the feasibility of administering 
the plan rather than with its results. Nevertheless it is an im­
portant consideration. Even the simplest plan involves many 
interpretations and arbitrary decisions in applying it to the 
various conditions of different areas and differently organized 
farms. Even the domestic allotment plan, which is very simple 
in theory, has become a very complex thing under the practical 
problems of application.
It should be remembered that governmental regulation is 
slow, cumbersome and expensive even under the most favorable
13
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circumstances. Also the difficulty of regulation increases ap­
proximately as fast as the number of points at which regulation 
must be applied. Where there are alternative methods of 
achieving the same objective with equal effectiveness, the one 
which involves administrative contacts with the smallest num­
ber of individuals is to be preferred.
The administrative problem also, increases with the number 
of times per year that it is necessary to communicate with or 
visit the individuals with whom the administrative body has 
dealings.
Where possible it would be advantageous to utilize admin­
istrative agencies already existing rather than to set up en­
tirely new bureaus. Changes in tariff rates are relatively 
simple to put into effect. Belief that has been administered 
through federal credit agencies has generally been low in cosU 
of administration. Relief through remission of taxes is likely 
to prove relatively simple and economical in its administration. 
An example of successful administration of an agricultural re­
striction plan, the Danish Hog Production Plan, is given in 
Appendix G.
Experience of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
indicates that production quotas can be allotted effectively by 
local committees of producers. It should be recognized, how­
ever, that the state or county quotas need to be fixed rather 
definitely by the central authority, since there, is a natural 
tendency for each committee to be liberal in considering the 
demands of its locality as contrasted with the needs of the 
body of producers as a whole. It should also be remembered 
that each committee is under a continuous pressure from the 
producers with whom it has dealings. Service on such com­
mittees is likely to prove onerous. Consequently, it may be 
difficult to get the most capable men to serve for any very 
protracted period.
7. The plan should utilize rathet than oppose private initiative.
Up to this time private initative exercised in the pursuit of 
individual gain has proved the strongest incentive to eco­
nomic action. The development of group consciousness has 
not lessened the strength o;f this incentive. Instead, it has 
(with a few exceptions) supplemented or reinforced the pri-
14
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vate profit incentive. Organization has more often added group 
action to that of the individual in promoting the common in­
terests of individuals composing the specific groups.
In spite of its many shortcomings, private initiative has been 
one of the most beneficial influences for society at large, since 
the individual ordinarily prospers by satisfying the wants of 
others. A plan for the advancement of agriculture should 
attempt to utilize this force rather than set it against the plan.
The plan should rest on strictly voluntary action on the 
part of the farmers concerned. Measures of open or hidden 
coercion should be avoided scrupulously. Anyone who con­
templates the application of compulsion to our 6 million 
farmers should consider the fate of other attempts at com­
pulsion of large groups of people. First, a natural resentment 
is aroused against anything that savors of coercion. Second, 
where there is a private gain to be made by evasion of 
regulations, economic pressure is towards non-cooperation or 
evasion. This accompanies each individual continuously while 
representatives of the law can visit him only at widely sep­
arated intervals.
8. The plan should give regard to the conservation of our 
natural resources.
Care should be taken that the plan, if it involves restriction 
of output, does not facilitate or permit deterioration of natural 
resources as by erosion or otherwise. The extent to which 
specific natural resources will be needed by future generations 
is, of course, largely unknown. But it is clear that once land 
is seriously eroded or otherwise damaged a long-time and a 
heavy expense is necessary to restore it to a reasonable degree 
of productivity. It is also obvious that some lands are being 
eroded at an alarming rate. On such lands considerable re­
duction in output might be obtained by assisting farmers in 
retiring erosive land to pasture or else in putting it into less 
exploitive rotations. This would not only be of immediate 
benefit as far as excess production is concerned, but would also 
preserve such land for the use of future generations.
It should be remembered that the nation can afford to take 
measures to conserve its resources which are either unprofitable 
to the individual or beyond his reach.
15
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9. It would be preferable to develop a separate plan for each 
area confronted by a distinct set of critical problems; also 
such plans should be confined to the respective areas for 
which they were formulated.
The problems involved in each type of farming area differ 
somewhat from those in any other. In some areas no control 
or restriction is needed. In others, perhaps, a large portion of 
farm land should be taken out of crops for some reason or 
other.
Crop and livestock enterprises, likewise, play different func­
tions in different areas. In a large part of Kansas and Ne­
braska wheat is the central product of the crop system. In 
Pennsylvania it is a relatively subordinate crop but serves as 
a nurse crop in a long established rotation. Here, too, the 
value of the straw often approaches that of the grain since it 
is needed as bedding on dairy farms. In some parts of Iowa, 
corn is raised as the principal cash crop. In the Cotton Belt 
it is usually subordinate in importance to cotton and is raised 
chiefly to feed work stock and to a small degree for human 
food. In New England and New York, cattle are kept almost 
entirely for the production of fluid milk, but part of the sea­
sonal surplus may be made into butter. This competes with 
butter made in Iowa as a by-product from what are mainly 
beef herds. The beef from calves in these latter herds com­
petes with grass fat beef from western ranges ahd with feeder 
steers which have been fattened in the Corn Belt.
An illustration of the effect of a blanket regulation for the 
entire country is seen in the results of the homestead act. The 
same size of homestead, 160 acres, was established in all new 
agricultural lands in humid regions. In many sections of rough 
land this has proved too small an acreage for economical 
operation. A more flexible system which varied the acreage 
with the productivity of the lan.d would have been far more 
advantageous and would have avoided many present-day prob­
lems.
On the other hand, this system was undoubtedly better than 
no system at all. Had the law permitted sale of unlimited 
acreages to anyone able to pay for them, a much less desirable 
form of agriculture would probably have developed. Where
16
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this was the case in some South American countries, great 
landed estates have developed in the hands of a few fortunate 
proprietors. The bulk of the population is forced by this same 
circumstance to occupy a subordinate position- in the employ­
ment of these wealthy proprietors.
Programs which are designed to apply equally to the entire 
country are very likely to involve a wasteful expenditure of 
funds in some areas and fall short of desirable objectives in 
others. More satisfactory results might be obtained, at a lower 
cost, if such plans were developed with regard to a limited 
number of relatively restricted areas in which there seems 
good reason to believe that a healthful natural recovery will 
not occur.
10. The plan should involve the minimum of social cost and 
should uproot the smallest possible proportion of the pop­
ulation.
Various elements of cost to society are involved in any plan 
of economic control. Some of these are direct and some in­
direct. Some of these costs are felt immediately and others 
after the lapse of considerable time.
The most obvious cost element is that of administration. A 
second type, somewhat related, consists of the benefit pay­
ments or subsidies necessary to induce producers to cooperate 
under the plan. A third element of social cost comes, in the 
form of increased prices to consumers. A fourth element is 
involved in the shifting of population groups out of areas 
where production is overexpanded and into areas or profes­
sions where they can make larger contributions to the public 
welfare.
Although the government purchase of large areas of land 
offérs a relatively simple means of retiring land from pro­
duction as far as administrative problems are concerned, such 
methods involve the wholesale uprooting of large masses of 
population. Because of its lack of experience and training, 
the type of populations be removed from inferior producing 
areas is likely to add directly or indirectly, to the burden of 
government, that is, of the remainder of society.
17
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Lack of adequate, centralized control over our economic 
activity has led to many abuses in the past. On the other hand, 
a serious social danger is implied in increased social control. 
The more strongly centralized government becomes, the more 
rigid the social structure. The element of society which is, 
in effect, tied to the soil and gaining its support entirely by its 
own efforts, provides the foundation for a relatively stable 
society. This possesses some very real social advantages 
which are already being lost rapidly because of the increasing 
mobility of population as well as the dependence of an in­
creasing proportion of population on governmental policies of 
one sort or another.
11. The plan must be as free from political influence as 
possible.
Many plans for economic control which would be quite 
feasible if developed and administered wholly by a body of 
highly trained and competent individuals, subject to no out­
side interference, are in fact wholly impracticable under our 
present social organization. In the last analysis it must be 
remembered that all plans and regulations now in operation, 
or likely to be in the near future, are controlled and admin­
istered not by scientifically trained experts, but partly or 
wholly by politicians.
At some point questions of political expediency enter into 
negotiations regarding the organization for an economic pro­
gram. In the compromise that follows, the essential principle 
may either be lost sight of, when settling some important de­
tail, or a compromise may be effected granting to some other 
group a special benefit which is not in the public interest.
Further, after the plan is put into effect, the selection of 
personnel is pretty sure to be influenced to some extent by 
considerations of political faithfulness which may, in some 
cases, run counter to requirements of special training or fit­
ness for the task to be performed. After the need for the 
specific plan passes away, there is likely to remain a strongly 
intrenched political vested interest involving both the re­
cipients of any direct subsidies and also the bureaucratic per­
sonnel.
18
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It seems doubtful that an autocratic government, even 
though honest and well intentioned, would be preferable even 
to the imperfect political organiaztion we now- have. On the 
other hand, it should not be supposed that all public under­
takings are inefficiently or wastefully carried out. Where a 
high degree of professional training is required, Capable and 
nonpartisan talent is usually made available. This? is true par­
ticularly of the governmental research bureaus. In most states 
it is true of the educational system and, in many, of the highway 
systems. In such cases as these public opinion would not stand 
for untrained or incompetent appointees. The condition varies 
widely from state to state. For instance, it is apparent that 
the Iowa highway system has been constructed economically 
and honestly. In some other states there have, pretty clearly, 
been wasteful expenditures.
In justice to the public official, one should remember that 
impossible tasks are sometimes expected of him. There is no 
evidence to demonstrate that a person becomes wiser or more 
capable when vested with public authority than he was as a 
private citizen. The government is composed of individuals 
who seem to be neither more nor less capable than other 
citizens, and they should not be expected to perform miracles 
nor to exercise an infallibility of which the private citizen is 
incapable. The conclusion to this section is that, to have a 
reasonable chance of success, an economic plan should be so 
formulated that it will create the smallest possible vested in­
terest, and so that it will involve no insuperable difficulty in 
its administration.
12. The plan should provide either for its own termination 
or for an orderly means of modification.
If  the plan is an emergency one, it should either be limited 
in duration or else it should define clearly the conditions under 
which it is to be terminated. As an example of this, the act 
establishing the National Recovery Administration provided 
for its termination on a specific date 2 years after its adoption. 
In the case of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration the 
attainment of “ parity price” terminates the provisions for 
each commodity.
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If  the plan is of a permanent type, a definite means should 
be provided for such modifications as are made advisable by 
future developments. The Stevenson Rubber plan was de­
fective in this respect. It permitted an increase in export allot­
ments of not over 10 percent per quarter. Consequently when 
the development of the balloon tire and a sharp increase in 
automobile output occurred simultaneously, it was not possible 
to permit planters to sell as much as the market was able to 
take even at highly remunerative prices. The greatest benefits 
of this artificial restriction of output were reaped by the Dutch, 
who had refused to join the plan.
Unexpected demand situations may develop after the plan 
has gone into effect. Technological changes may call for a dif­
ferent treatment than that originally contemplated. Drouths 
or floods may call for relaxation of control or for control of a 
different type. I f  flexibility is not provided, the plan may, 
under some one of these unexpected conditions, prove to do 
more harm than good.
Finally, it would be well if an orderly method were pro­
vided for retiring from the plan of control, particularly if it 
is of an emergency nature. Sudden termination of a rigid 
control plan may throw an industry into chaos as great as that 
from which the same plan was supposed to rescue it. If 
termination threatens to upset the industry, fear of this sit­
uation may lead to the retention of the plan long after the 
need for it has disappeared.
« *  # # # # #
In passing upon the desirability of particular economic plans, 
the farmer or other citizen may expect to find his'safest guide 
in a thorough acquaintance with economic history. New plans 
generally prove to have been tried to some extent or in some 
form previously. Much of the enthusiasm with which ambitious 
plans for social control are greeted comes from inexperience 
with consequences of similar plans which have been tried out 
previously. Naturally, all possible social experiments cannot 
be tried out within each person’s lifetime. Therefore, history 
is often the only source of information on which a reasoned 
judgment can be based.
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It should be remembered that there is a natural method by 
which needed shifts in production work themselves out. This 
is through increases or declines in value of the commodity con­
cerned. It should not be concluded that an increase in social 
control is undesirable nor always doomed to failure. The 
civilized world has passed through many cycles of increasing 
and decreasing control over economic activity. For several 
decades in this country the degree of social control has been 
increasing with, generally, profitable results. But it is not 
social control in gen era l but in specific  forms that is to be 
approved or condemned.
Among measures of social control which have proved them­
selves beneficial may be mentioned the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commis­
sion, establishment of the Federal Reserve System, the Packers 
and Stockyards Administration, the Grain Futures Act, and 
many others. These measures have not dealt with agriculture 
and are not quite analogous to the various plans now proposed 
for control or relief of this industry. There is no reason, how­
ever, to suppose that further plans beneficial to agriculture 
cannot be developed. Farmers and other citizens have a serious 
responsibility in passing a reasoned judgment on each im­
portant plan that comes before them.
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A PPEN D IX A
“STABILIZATION” OF W HEAT PRICES BY TH E FED ERAL
FARM BOARD
It seems probable that the Board considered the price decline of 
late 1929 as purely temporary and believed that wheat would soon 
rise above the figure of $1.20 to which it had declined at Kansas City 
in 1929.
After loans to cooperatives for the purpose of holding their wheat 
for better prices failed to have effect, the Board began to buy wheat. 
By June 30, 1930, it had 65 million bushels. But in the meantime 
prices at Kansas City had got down to about 80 cents and Liverpool 
prices to approximately $1.
With the short corn crop of 1930 and the prospect that much wheat 
would be fed, the Board again undertook to support the price. Heavy 
purchases were made from September, 1930, to April, 1931. By buy­
ing all wheat offered, the price was pegged from November, 1930, to 
June, 1931, at around 80 cents on Chicago May futures. At this rate 
Kansas City was 5 to 10 cents above Liverpool in contrast with the 
usual level of 20 to 25 cents below Liverpool. By June 30, 1931, the 
Grain Stabilization Corporation, which was the agency of the Farm  
Board, held a total of 257 million bushels. This was 77 percent of the 
total United States carry-over.
On March 23, 1931, the Farm Board announced that it would not 
purchase any wheat from the 1931 crop. On June 30, it announced 
that in disposing of what wheat it held, it would not sell over 5 mil­
lion bushels per month to avoid breaking the price. After this the 
price was permitted to seek its own level. From the last of June until 
the middle of July the price at Kansas City fell from a point just 
under 75 cents to 45 cents. This was about 15 cents below Liverpool.
The net result of this experiment was that Wheat in Kansas City 
was held from October, 1930, until June,'1931, at a level between 70 
and 75 cents. For most of this period Liverpool was 10 cents below 
this level. Total purchases had amounted to nearly 330 million bush­
els, costing $270,000,000. The Farm Board in its Third Annual Report 
estimated that it supported the United States wheat price at a level 
25 to 35 cents higher than it would otherwise have been. It estimated 
that it had enabled producers to receive at least $100,000,000 and-pos­
sibly as much as $160,000,000 more than they would have received 
without the stabilization operations. At the same time it estimated 
its loss at $154,000,000 after counting as a credit the value of 40 
million bushels of wheat turned over to the Red Cross on Congres­
sional authority.
As in the case of the Brazilian experience, it was found much 
more difficult to get rid of the wheat than to buy it. On July 1, 
1932, the Grain Stabilization Corporation still had on hand 108 million
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bushels. Export sales had amounted to around 40 million bushels, 
sales to foreign governments to 47,800,000 bushels. Net sales in do­
mestic markets had amounted to 20 million bushels and transfer to 
the Red Cross to 40 million. Later on another 45 million bushels was 
transferred to the Red Cross. In order to get any wheat exported it 
was necessary to sell to exporters well below the American price. It 
seemed rather appropriate that, of the wheat sold to foreign govern­
ments, 25 million bushels had been traded with the Brazilian Govern­
ment for 1,050,000 bags of coffee from the stock which that govern­
ment was holding for “stabilization” purposes.
In general, it seems doubtful that the stabilization operations had 
any pronounced effect on world prices. Even though it removed 
wheat from the market, and reduced for a time the load that growers 
or speculators would have had to carry; the wheat was still known 
to be in existence and hanging over the market. The Farm Board 
claims credit for supporting the market when it was buying wheat. 
But it makes no statement as to the effect of its sales of wheat when 
the stocks were being disposed of. The disposition of these stocks 
was completed June 27, 1933.
The conclusions of the Farm Board as to its effort at stabilization 
are well worth pondering. In its Second Annual Report it stated 
that: “Prices cannot be kept artificially high over long periods by 
such methods. The experience of the past 2 years shows it is futile 
to engage in stabilization purchases for any product over a period of 
years in the face of a constantly accumulating surplus of that product.
“Stabilization involves selling as well as buying; producers must 
face this fact. Many people have thought ‘stabilization’ means to hold 
the price permanently higher than it would otherwise be. This can­
not be done without control of production.------------ ”
In the Third Annual Report these conclusions were supplemented 
as follows:
“1. Prices can be maintained above their normal levels if some 
agency is prepared to pay the costs.
“2. Stabilization costs must be paid by someone. To help farmers, 
they would have to be paid by others, either in higher prices or high­
er taxes.---------
“3. The experience in disposing of stabilization stocks to date has 
demonstrated that accumulated supplies can be eased into the mar­
kets without depressing current prices below the levels set by the 
existing supplies5 and the prevailing level of demand.
“4. The very act of purchasing supplies and maintaining prices 
in surplus years, tends to encourage farmers to continue production, 
and so to prevent the deficit years, in which the supplies could be
'Does the Board mean to imply th at its own accumulated stocks com prise 
part of these “supplies?”
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sold without loss, from ever arriving. In the long run stabilization 
tends to perpetuate the very situation it is aimed to relieve.
“5. --------- If domestic prices are maintained above world parities,
foreign buyers are unable to purchase at the domestic level of prices.
If.---------the selling agency is in a position to sell at world prices to
foreign buyers, the accumulated stocks may be disposed of without 
reducing domestic prices to the lower world level. Such transac­
tions, however, cannot be conducted on a large or permanent scale 
without leading to foreign retaliation, and hence do not offer a per­
manent method of operation.
“Experience with stabilization thus demonstrates that no measure 
for improving the price of farm products other than increasing the 
demand of consumers can be effective over a period of years unless it 
provides a more definite control of production than has been achieved 
so far.”
A PPEN D IX B
TH E VALORIZATION OF C O FFEE6
The greater part of the world crop of coffee is produced by Brazil. 
The heaviest producing area is in the state of Sao Paulo. Coffee 
trees have a strong tendency to yield bumper crops every second or 
third year. After a bumper crop the trees tend to go into a period 
of 1 or 2 years of low production. Consequently, there is an obvious 
advantage in carrying part of the bumper crop over into the following 
year of low yield. This has led to a series of efforts to regularize 
the flow of coffee to market. Unfortunately, these have, several times, 
gone awry and have been distorted into attempts to raise price to 
levels that could not be maintained.
The first effort at valorization of coffee was undertaken by the 
state of Sao Paulo in 1905. Heavy stocks of coffee had grown up 
as a result of large crops. There was a prospect of a bumper crop in 
1906. Consequently the state of Sao Paulo obtained foreign loans in 
order to buy up 8 million bags of coffee, almost equivalent to a year’s 
crop. This was to be held for a year or so until it could be disposed 
of profitably. But it did not prove so easy to get rid of the coffee as 
to buy it. The entire amount was not finally disposed of until a 
series of short crops occurred from 1911 to 1913.
The second effort occurred in 1917 as a result of heavy supplies and 
reduced European demand during the war. The coffee purchased this 
time was disposed of at a profit in 1919, a year of short crop and in­
creasing demand. In each case the expectation of better prices from 
valorization led to larger plantings. Since coffee trees begin to bear 
in 5 or 6 years, the stimulative effect on production was not felt until 
long after the immediate benefits of valorization had passed away.
6Bulletin of the Pan  Am erican Union, Vol. 67, No. 7, Ju ly , 1933. Agricultural 
P rice  Supporting Measures in Latin  America, by Myer Lynsky.
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Low prices during the primary post-war depression of 1921, led to 
a renewed effort at valorization. This time the coffee was stored in 
Brazil instead of abroad. The plan was to support price by regulating 
the flow of coffee into the port of Santos from which practically all 
Brazilian coffee is shipped. From 1922 to 1931 the Federal Govern­
ment left most of the control with the state of Sao Paulo. With re­
covery of demand in 1922 and the following years, coffee prices ap­
pear to have been generally satisfactory, although the carry-over was 
beginning to pile up in warehouses in the producing region. Also the 
profitable prices led to increased planting.
The size of the coffee crop varies greatly from year to year. In 
the 1927-28 crop year 34 million bags were raised or about 50 percent 
more than the large crops of the preceding years. The total world 
stocks shot upwards from 7,700,000 bags to 18,200,000 bags, of which
12.900.000 were held in the Brazilian warehouses. In the following 
year the crop was down to 18 million bags and the carry-over was 
reduced by 4 million. But in the 1929-30 year the crop was 37,700,000 
bags, and at the end of this year Sao Paulo found itself holding
25.800.000 and with a new crop of 24,800,000 bags coming on.
In April, 1930, a new foreign loan of £20,000,000 ($97,000,000) was 
negotiated to pay off $34,000,000 previously borrowed, to buy 3 mil­
lion bags of coffee and hold it from market and to continue financing 
the storage operations. Service on the loan was to be met by an 
export tax on coffee shipped out of Brazil. The lenders required as a 
condition to the loan, that no further stocks were to be allowed to 
accumulate.
In 1931 the Federal Government took charge of the situation again. 
A small annual tax was placed on each new tree planted except for
T A B L E  1. PRODUCTION AND Ç R IC E  O F C O F F E E
(F rom  the Annalist, Vol. 40, No. 1031, Oet. 21, 1932)
World Coffee Production, Consumption and Stocks Crop year Ju ly  1-June 30 








































1925-1926................. 22,108 21,698 7,324 2,833 19.5
1926-1927................. 21,818 21,300 7,705 3,312 16.4
1927-1928................. 33,948 23,537 18,232 12,911 14.9
1928-1929.. 18,154 22,232 14,314 8,962 17.6
1929-1930................. 37,677 23,553 31,510 25,831 11.9
1930-1931................. 24,797 25,148 28,721 21,997 6.9
1931-1932................. 34,314 23,728 31,683 26,214 6 .9
* Including segregated stocks.
(About 70 per cent of the 1931-32 Crop from Brazil, i. e., other crops run about 8 million 
bags.)
T Prices from Standard Statistics Base Book.
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replacement purposes. A tax of $2.43 per bag (1.8 cents per pound) 
was placed on all coffee exports. The coffee-producing states were to 
agree to place an equal tax on coffee shipped out of their respective 
territories for a period of 4 years. The proceeds of the latter were 
to be used for the “elimination” of surplus. On June 7, 1931, the de­
struction of coffee by burning was begun. By the end of June, 1932, 
13 million bags of coffee had been bought of which 8 million bags had 
been destroyed. The coffee growers, however, were far from happy, 
because these taxes amounted to half the export price in the Santos 
market.
During the years of the earlier valorization efforts, the stimulation 
of price by Brazil, led to the founding of a coffee growing industry in 
Central America. This has apparently continued to thrive and has 
profited by the efforts of Brazil while the latter country has borne 
the costs of valorization. The net effect of Brazil’s efforts seem to 
have been chiefly to regulate the flow of coffee to market and to carry 
over surpluses from heavy crops into following years. This appears 
to have resulted in less fluctuation in prices. But the known exist­
ence of heavy Brazilian stocks hanging over the market have prevent­
ed prices from rising very far.
At the same time, the fact that growers found prices sufficient to 
merit increased plantings raises doubt as to whether any artificial 
measures were needed until relatively recent years. Without control 
over production, temporary gains would have made for ultimate de­
feat anyhow.
The relatively satisfactory prices led to large plantings of new trees. 
The only way to maintain high prices would have been to prohibit 
new plantings. Even this would have been only partly successful 
since production was gradually expanding in Columbia and Central 
America. Had new plantings been prohibited when the bumper crop 
of 1927 came into sight, in September, 1926, 2 years of very heavy 
• planting would have been avoided. But naturally such control would
have been unpopular with most of the planters. It was not actually 
put into effect until 1931 when low prices made it unnecessary to in­
voke any prohibition.
Many of the later errors of this scheme could have been avoided 
had it not been in political hands. It was obvious by 1928 that the 
plan was due for a collapse. But the Sao Paulo politicians, who 
were administering it, were naturally reluctant to admit defeat and 
prolonged the apparent prosperity as long as they could. As J. W. F. 
Rowe says, “A collapse which might be delayed for 3 or 4 years 
mattered less to them than political advantages in the immediate fu­
ture.”7 From September, 1928, onwards the political rather than eco­
nomic motives came to dominate the plan.
7R oyal Econom ic Society. Memorandum No. 34, page 17. J .  W  F  Rowe, 
Studies m  the Artificial Control, of Raw . M aterial Supplies. No. 3, Brazilian 
Coffee. ’
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Rowe’s conclusion on this point is highly suggestive: “Few, if any, 
Governments can be trusted to conduct an artificial control scheme 
such as this defence of coffee; sooner or later economic considerations 
will be subordinated to political expediency. Such control schemes 
must be operated by the business interests concerned, and if the aid 
of the State is required, the State can be given adequate representa­
tion, such as will ensure legitimate public pressure against any at­
tempt by those business interests to sacrifice the interests of the na­
tion to the temporary benefit of the few.” However, “----- -------we
reach the ultimate conclusion that, in such countries as Brazil, ex­
periments in artificial control will probably remain largely in the 
hands of politicians, although experience points unmistakably to the 
tremendous risks of distortion for political purposes.”
A PPEN D IX C
From  “The Tariff on Sugar,” by Lippert S. Ellis, page 152.
TA BLE 2. D ISTRIBU TIO N  O F T H E  B E N E F IT S  OF T H E  SUGAR DUTY, 1930
Cost to all U. S. consumers, 5,599,377 long tons refined 
sugar at 2.1402 c per lb. (2.00 c 96° basis) or $47.94
per long ton ............................ ............ ........................ ..................................... ......... $268,434,133
Customs revenue collected, 1930 —................................................$115,121,253
Benefits to U. S. Beet and cane grow ers and refiners of
domestic sugar, 1,116.508 long tons at $47.94..............  53,525,394
Benefits to insular growers and m anufacturers, 1,999,590
long tons at $47.94 ............... ....................................................  95,860,345
Hawaii, 672,443 tons .............................................32,236,918
Porto Rico, 659,796 tons ............. ............. ......31,199,160
Philippines, 671,296 tons .....   32,181,930
Virgin Islands, 5,055 tons .............................. 242,337
Unaccounted for* .......................... ........ ................................................ 3,927,141
Total ........... ............................................................................. .........$268,434,133 $268!,434,133
*Since the figures are from  different sources it  is practically impossible to 
balance them accurately.
A PPEN D IX D
VARIATION IN COSTS—COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
The differences in absolute costs of various farm commodities as 
between different areas are well known. Table 3 affords a compari­
son of the amounts of labor required to grow an acre or 100 bushels 
of corn in six widely separated sections of the United States. These 
data are obtained from cost studies on groups of farms and do not 
represent averages of all farms in the sections named. Nevertheless 
they give a pretty good idea of the extent to which the labor costs in 
com production do vary. The labor required per acre depends partly 
on the practices used, partly on the topography and partly on the size 
of field. The number of hours of labor required to raise a given 
amount of corn, say 100 bushels, depends on the labor requirements 
per acre and also bn the yield.
As is shown in table 3 the amount of labor used in raising and har­
vesting an acre of corn varied from 12.2 hours in South Dakota to 58
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T A B L E  3. LA BO R R EQ U IR ED  TO PRO DUCE CORN,—VARIATION  


















Year............................... 1925-27 1920-24 1921-23 1922 1927 1927-30
Yield per acre, bu.. .  . 









Hours labor per acre. 16.8 ' 18.1 23.6 12.2 42.2 58.6
Hours labor to grow
100 bu....................... 33.1 40.1 66.1 44.2 187.4 198.6
1 From Iowa Bulletin 289.
2 Ohio Bulletin 396.
3 Kentucky Bulletin 274.
4 South Dakota Circular 4.
5 Mississippi Bulletin 256.
3 New York, Cornell, Mimeographed publication, “Results of Cost Accounts in Grain 
Crops,” November, 1931.
in New York where an av( rage of only 3.7 acres per farm was har­
vested for grain. The amount of labor required to raise and harvest 
100 bushels of corn varied from 33.1 hours in Iowa to 198 hours on 
the New York farms.8
If the farmers in each of these areas spent equal amounts of their 
time in raising corn, their total output of all farm products would 
be much less than they are capable of producing. Suppose they all 
need corn, wheat, tobacco, cotton and dairy products, where should 
these commodities be produced? Obviously these farmers will all 
have more of these things to consume if specialization in each product 
occurs where it enjoys the greatest comparative advantage. This 
means that the Iowa farmer is the one who should specialize in corn. 
The South Dakota farmer will find that small grains can be grown 
more advantageously in South Dakota than corn. Cotton has the 
advantage in Mississippi, tobacco in Kentucky, and dairy products in 
New York.
This does not mean that no corn will be grown in any section ex­
cept Iowa. Specialization in one crop involves a high degree of busi­
ness risk, does not keep labor employed the year round, and does not 
conserve soil fertility. What it does mean is that insofar as special­
ization is feasible, the nation as a whole will be able to support a 
higher standard of living if each area organizes its farm enterprises 
around the crops in which it has the advantage. Any agricultural 
adjustment plan which interferes with the working out of this prin­
ciple is simply lowering the standard of living of the nation below
8I t  should be remembered th at different methods are used in different areas. 
This tends to exaggerate the difference in labor requirem ents per acre, par­
ticularly between the w estern areas in Table 3 and the New Y ork and Mis­
sissippi areas. In Iowa and South D akota nearly all the corn is harvested 
from  the standing stalks. In New York it is cut and shocked and then is 
husked from  the shocks, m aterially increasing the labor per acre.
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what it is capable of enjoying, or is requiring people to work longer 
hours to produce the same amount of goods, which is another aspect 
of the same thing.
As was said on page 170 the greatest advantage in a given area is 
enjoyed, not by the production of a single crop, but by a combination 
of crops and livestock products. This is more difficult to illustrate than 
the productivity of a single crop.
On a farm in the heart of the Corn Belt, and under a given price 
situation, corn may be the most remunerative single crop available. 
But the farmer cannot raise corn alone. It would not provide year- 
round employment for his labor. It would not maintain the productiv­
ity of his soil, and there would be no way of utilizing the by-product 
of cornstalks. Over a number of years the soil would be maintained 
better and net income increased by a rotation of crops. The corn­
stalks and some of the other crops could be converted into marketable 
commodities only by livestock. If cattle or sheep can be produced 
advantageously they will need other roughages and will also need 
pasture. If hay is to be raised for the cattle and to facilitate soil 
conservation, it will be necessary to raise small grains to serve as 
nurse crops. If the farmer is located at a distance from markets, it 
will be profitable to feed a large part of the corn crop to hogs or 
steers. Consequently we find the farmer developing a relatively 
complex system of farming rather than raising corn alone.
The proportions between acreages of different crops raised, however, 
will depend on their relative prices, or on relative prices of the live­
stock products into which they can be converted. If, for instance, 
oats become very low in price there will be an effort to keep the 
acreage of this crop to a minimum or else to substitute some other 
nurse crop in place of it.
If hogs are low and cattle are high in price there will be some shift 
from hogs to cattle, but the extent of this shift will be limited by the 
fact that cattle require roughage while hogs require very little. To 
raise more hay for the cattle it would be necessary to plant more 
small grains as a nurse crop. It also implies less corn. So the shift 
will tend to stop when a new balance has been reached which, under 
the new set of price conditions, promises the maximum return for the 
use of the farmer’s resources taken as a whole.
It is important to realize that the shift involves, to a greater or 
lesser extent, all the enterprises in the business and not merely the 
crop which has risen or fallen in price. If the farmer is required to 
raise less corn and more pasture or roughage, for example, this is 
likely to mean more than a proportionate decline in the acreage of 
corn, worth perhaps $20 per acre, and an increase in hay, worth per­
haps $16 per acre. It means a decline in the feed grains available for 
livestock production, and an increase in the proportion of roughage 
which must be fed on the farm. This may necessitate a decided re-
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duction in the number of hogs raised and an increase in the number 
of cattle.
Changing the proportions of these feeds will mean a decided change 
in the feeding value of grains and roughages. Since there is now 
less grain, each bushel will be worth relatively more for feeding pur­
poses than before. Since there is more hay, each ton will be worth 
less than before. In otjier words, the problem will now be how to 
economize on the feeding of corn and how to use roughage more 
liberally. If the livestock system was the most productive that the 
farmer could devise before the change, the value of its output may 
be seriously reduced. The value of the two crops for purposes of 
feeding on the farm may be changed so that an acre of corn comes 
to be worth $22, while the last acre of hay raised may be worth (that 
is, adds to the value of total livestock produced) only $14 instead of 
$16.
A PPEN D IX E
TH E STEVENSON RUBBER CONTROL PLAN9
The unexpected difficulties and offsetting influences which are like­
ly to plague agencies undertaking economic control are aptly illus­
trated by the Stevenson plan for the control of crude rubber. During 
the World War the planting of new rubber trees increased rapidly in 
response to strong demand. Prices were remunerative and the rubber 
plantation companies, owned chiefly in England, paid high dividends. 
At the end of the war, during the depression of 1920-22, the price of 
rubber fell from 50 cents per pound in New York at the first of 1920 
to under 20 cents by the end of the year. At the same time the cord 
tire began to be made in place of the old fabric tire. This required 
about the same amount of rubber per tire but gave a much greater 
mileage. Consequently the amount of rubber needed for replacement 
tires declined considerably. By the early part of 1922 rubber was 
down to 12 cents. The result was sharp distress among planters and 
natives in the Malayan rubber producing areas.
In 1920 planters began to talk of some means of restricting out­
put. First an effort was made in 1921 to reduce production by vol­
untary action. The results were negligible. As time went on, agi­
tation for a compulsory restriction scheme gained ground. Condi­
tions seemed favorable for such a scheme. About 70 percent of the 
world’s crude rubber was produced in British possessions chiefly in 
the Federated Malay States and Ceylon. Slightly over one-fourth of 
the supply was produced in the Netherlands East Indies. A small 
amount came from wild rubber trees, mostly in Brazil. About 70 
percent of the world’s production was purchased by the United States.
9This discussion is chiefly based on Charles R. W hittlesey’s book, “Govern­
mental Control of Crude Rubber.”
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Early in 1921 the British Colonial office was definitely opposed to 
restriction and took the stand that matters should be permitted to 
right themselves—a policy of laissez faire. To this the Planters’ As­
sociation replied in its Report for 1922: “This alternative should be
the last—the counsel of despair. --------- All roads lead to restriction
an d we are driven back upon compulsory restriction as the only means
of bringing relief to a sorely embarrassed industry.--------- The revival
of the demand for rubber is likely to be slow, too slow, at all events 
to be of much use to a number of estates now producing at a loss.
---------It is our view that a wise government must take some risks
when the interests of the whole community are bound up in the sal­
vation of a staple industry.”
During 1921 and 1922 a committee from British Malaya conferred 
with a committee of the Dutch. The latter agreed that the interests 
of the Netherlands Indies and British Malaya were identical but stated 
that they had decided not to take any legislative action to restrict 
output. Late in 1922 the British decided to proceed alone. As a 
result the Stevenson committee which had been appointed to study 
the situation, recommended a method by which exports were to be 
limited in accordance with the price. This scheme was adopted by 
the legislative councils and governors of the various British Malay 
states and went into effect Nov. 1, 1922.
Under this method a prohibitive tax was placed on any export of 
rubber from the producing areas not in accordance with the plan. 
Permits were issued to each planter for the amount he was to be 
allowed to export. The year ending Oct. 31, 1920, was selected as the 
period of “standard production.” Growers were to be permitted to 
export not over 60 percent of their production in this base period. 
As prices rose above the existing levels it was provided that the ex­
portable quotas might be increased by quarterly periods in accordance 
with a definite schedule.
Business conditions were recovering after the depression of 1920- 
1922 and demand was becoming stronger, but the first effects of adop­
tion of the plan were largely psychological. In the first quarter fol­
lowing adoption of the plan, rubber prices rose from about 16 cents 
to 35 cents per pound. This permitted increasing the exportable 
quota from 60 to 65 percent of “standard.” Speculative enthusiasm, 
however, soon died down, and at the end of 1923 the price was around 
22 cents, declining later to under 20 cents in the short depression of 
1924.
A rapid increase in production of autos now occurred in the United 
States. To this was added a new and unexpected demand influence— 
the adoption of the balloon tire. This tire required about 30 percent 
more rubber than the cord tire, and also it was necessary for dealers 
to lay in a stock t>f the new type tires. The supply of rubber was 
relatively limited and consequently prices shot upwards from 20 cents 
in July, 1924 to 40 cents in. December, and from there to $1.20 in July,
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1925. Until the end of 1925 the price was between $1.00 and $1.10 
most of the time.
Now, it was found that the Stevenson plan had failed to make al­
lowance for any such rapid increase in demand for rubber, and its 
regulations permitted quotas to be increased only by 10 percent per 
quarter. At this stage the American consumers became highly ex­
ercised over the outlook, but their protests fell on deaf ears. In the 
yearbook of the Planters’ Association of Ceylon for 1925 it was said 
“We regret that our American friends have had to pay such high prices 
for their requirements, but really the fault is theirs. They would not 
purchase while rubber was cheap and thus maintain the supply. Per­
haps they thought the scheme was a bluff.”
The Malayan Tin and Rubber Journal of Feb. 28, 1926, com­
mented : “Our American friends are threatening to grow their own 
rubber. The time for us to consider the selling of our rubber at an 
‘economical price’ will come, perhaps, when these American planta­
tions are in full swing.--------- Meantime, we'repeat that we in Malaya,
and our planting friends in Ceylon, have absolutely no call to consider 
the interests of the American users of crude rubber.”
The official view was expressed by Sir William Hicks, British Sec­
retary of State for Home Affairs:
“We made the rubber growing industry. We have the right to 
do our best in the interest of ourselves for that industry. Other na­
tions had the same opportunity as we had to develop these great rub­
ber plantations, but they failed to do so because they had no imagina­
tion, insight and courage to do what Britain has done.”
Meantime, storms were brewing for the restriction plan in several 
different quarters. First, the quotas had been set at generous levels 
and the reduction to 60 percent of “standard” accomplished a reduc­
tion in the permitted British output only from 272,000 tons in 1922 
to 234,000 in 1924. At the same time smugglers began to appear 
with small boats in the creeks and inlets running into the rubber 
producing sections. The amount of rubber smuggled out will, of 
course, never be known. But exportations from ports in neighboring 
states increased sharply in spite of the British effort to stop smug­
gling.
At the same time the Dutch continued to tap their trees to full 
capacity, so that their production increased from 108,000 tons in 1922 
to 160,000 tons in 1924, as is shown in table 4. Part of this increase 
came from trees planted during the war, which were just coming into 
bearing. The rubber tree is not ordinarily tapped until it is 5 years 
old.
In America the Department of Commerce, auto manufacturers, and 
even the rubber manufacturing companies began to put out literature 
telling how to get more miles per tire or otherwise economize rubber. 
Research was started which led to methods of manufacturing more 
durable tires. Methods of reclaiming rubber were developed to a much
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T A B LE 4. W O RLD  R U B B E R  PRODUCTION (N ET E X P O R T S ) B Y  AREAS,
1919-32*


















1919............................... 257,761 91,229 399,731 64.5 48.7
1920............................... 226,389 78,717 342,033 66.2 36.3
1921............................... 201,228 76,288 301,512 66.8 16.4
1922............................... 271,686 107,834 406,394 66.8 17.6
1923............................... 235,599 144,459 408,641 57.6 29.7
1924............................... 233,809 160,228 425,991 54.9 26.2
1925............................... 281,839 206,986 528,485 53.3 72.5
1926............................... 268,268 213,895 622,477 59.2 48.6
1927............................... 324,627 243,506 612,548 53.0 37.9
1928............................... 385,460 240,721 658,000 57.8 22.4
1929............................... 853,000 20.6
1930............................... 814,000 11.9
1 9 3 1 ... . 792,000 6.2
1932. . , 730i000 3 .4
* Production 1919-28 from Whittlesey, Charles R., Governmental Control of Crude 
Rubber, page 104. Production from 1929-32 from Moody’s Manual of Industrials. Price 
from Standard Statistics Base Book.
greater degree than previously. The production of reclaimed rubber 
in the U. S. increased from 54,000 tons in 1922 to 208,000 tons in 1928. 
Further a search was made for other possible sources of rubber and 
efforts were redoubled to produce synthetic rubber.
It was at this time that Harvey Firestone obtained a concession in 
Liberia for the purpose of planting out a large rubber plantation. In 
1927 Henry Ford obtained a concession in the Amazon basin which 
made a large area available for planting rubber trees in their native 
habitat. In the meantime the British continued to set out new trees 
at the same rate as before. Planting in Dutch possessions greatly in­
creased, particularly planting by natives. These new trees contributed 
to the production of rubber long after the Stevenson scheme was 
dropped in 1928.
T A B L E  5. ESTIM A TED  ACREAG E PL A N T ED  TO R U B B E R  IN T H E  








1919................................ 2,726 842 315 94 3,977
1920................................ 2,868 883 460 103 4,314
1921............. ................... 2,934 918 480 109 4,441
1922................................ 2,977 940 540 113 4,570
1923................................ 3,054 950 615 146 4,765
1924................................ 3,113 979 675 160 4,927
1925................................ 3,184 1,025 825 195 5,229
1926................................ 3,345 1,102 1,050 265 5,762
1927.............................. , 3,493 1,199 1,300 345 6,337
1928................................ 3,616 1,299 1,400 385 6,700
* From Whittlesey, Charles R., Governmental Control of Crude Rubber, page 109.
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When the plan was originally adopted a price of 12 to 15 pence (24 
to 30 cents) was regarded as nècessary to the industry. The re­
striction plan was built up about this pivotal level of price. But 
when prices had risen to a higher level it was decided, in 1926, to 
raise the pivotal price to 21 pence (42 cents). This was partly 
caused by the general view of the planters that restriction prevented 
the full use of their resources and thereby raised their costs. This 
appears to be true, perhaps to as much as 10 percent of the previous 
level of cost. The point, however, is a startling one. The industry 
needed restriction in order to obtain a satisfactory price. But re­
striction increased the cost per pound so that a higher price was 
needed under restriction than under free production!
Among difficulties besetting the administration of the Stevenson 
plan, smuggling has already been referred to. It was complained 
by government officials that the profit in rubber smuggling was 
leading to the smuggling of other articles as well and to corruption 
in other direction. For a while there was serious trouble in sup­
pression of counterfeiting of rubber export coupons. At first the 
plan had to face the difficult task of assigning quotas to the individual 
planters. These when finally assigned, proved to be on a rather lib­
eral basis so that less restriction was accomplished than was hoped 
for. Nevertheless, there were some inequalities, and it was not long 
before the administrative authorities had to enlarge the quotas ot 
some types of planters. From year to year the tendency was to grant 
a part of the requests for larger quotas. Finally it was said in 1927 
that the quotas had, by that time, been raised so much that restriction 
was practically a dead letter. The plan was finally suspended Nov. 
1, 1928.
In 1922 before the adoption of the Stevenson plan the world pro­
duction of rubber was 406,000 tons, as shown in table 4, of which 
British possessions produced 67 percent. In 1928 when it was aban­
doned, the world production was 658,000 tons. By this time, produc­
tion in other areas had increased until British possessions were pro­
ducing only 53 to 59 percent. Production continued to expand after 
the Stevenson plan was abandoned, as trees which had been planted 
under its stimulation came into bearing. In 1929 world production 
was 853,000 tons. By 1932 low prices had reduced it to 730,000 tons.
Meantime the price of rubber in New York, which averaged 16.4 
cents in 1921, during the depression of that year, had risen to over a 
dollar and then had settled back to 22.4 cents as an average for 1928. 
In 1932 it reached a level under 3 cents and has since recovered to 
around 13 cents (June, 1934).
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A PPE N D IX  F
RECENT TRENDS IN CROP ACREAGES
An illustration of diversity of trends in acreages of particular crops 
is shown in table 6. The annual acreages of corn, oats, and wheat 
harvested in 10 eastern states are contrasted with acreages for 7 
states in the Great Plains area. In each of these areas a pronounced 
increase in acreage occurred between 1909 and 1919, largely in re­
sponse to war-time demand. After the war, however, trends in the 
two areas diverged.
In the western area, acreages either continued to increase or else 
declined very little. This was caused largely by the development of 
large capacity mechanical equipment which made it cheaper to pro­
duce grain crops in level or gently rolling sections of this region. To 
some extent also the expansion was encouraged by development of 
varieties better adapted to the dry climate. Sharp declines in acre­
ages of oats and wheat harvested in 1931 and 1933 are to be attributed 
largely to abandonment because of winter killing or drouth.
In the 10 eastern states the trend was very different. Corn declined 
from 20,789,000 acres in 1919 to 17,525,000 in 1925 and to under 16,- 
000,000 by 1929. Oats remained at about the same level until 1925 
and then declined from 5,339,000 acres to 3,867,000 in 1929. Wheat 
declined from 9,489,000 acres in 1919 to 5,409,000 in 1925 and to 
5,000,000 acres in 1929. In other words, the disadvantageous com­
petitive price situation of the eastern states and their inability to use 
large capacity machinery in small hilly fields resulted, in less than a 
decade, in approximately a 25 percent reduction in corn and oats and 
nearly a 50 percent reduction in wheat. These declines in the East 
were more than offset by increases in the western states.
T A B L E  6. CHANGES IN ACREAG ES O F CORN, OATS AND W H EA T
H A R V ESTED






















1909. . ? ....................... 19,384 17,974 5,101 7,033 6,799 19,480
1919.............................. 20,789 16,060 5,371 9,133 9,489 31,467
1925............................. 17,525 23,314 5,339 10,552 5,409 28,144
1929............................... 15,765 24,086 3,867 8,717 5,000 36,103
1930........................... 15,615 24,586 4,330 8,671 4,773 36,113
1931............................... 16,274 24,791 4,448 7,523 4,897 29,942
1932............................... 15,968 26,792 4,254 9,104 4,756 32,266
1933............................... 15,879 24,567 3,799 6,849 5,023 24,418
* New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, 
Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio. .
t  North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Nebraska, Colorado and Kansas.
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From such figures as these, one gains the impression that acreages 
in particular crops respond rather promptly to changes in relative 
prices and relative costs. Where such movements are in progress it 
is futile as well as very expensive to oppose them until they have run 
their course. Also the nation as a whole stands to gain by shifting 
its production to the areas where crops can be produced at the lowest 
relative cost.
A PPEN D IX  G
TH E DANISH HOG PRODUCTION CONTROL PLAN
The Danish Hog Production Control Plan is a case in which admin­
istrative difficulties have been met satisfactorily, and in which a con­
trol measure has apparently functioned well up to the present time. 
Great Britain has been the principal consumer of Danish bacon. In 
1932 Great Britain decided to stimulate English hog production and to 
restrict imports by allotting quotas to non-Empire countries. Con­
sequently, the Danes decided to adjust their hog production to the 
reduced demand by some definite plan of control, rather than to under­
go the much more painful process of liquidation forced through a fur­
ther collapse of hog prices.
Conditions for a control plan were relatively favorable. The area 
of the Kingdom of Denmark is only about one-third that of the state 
of Iowa. A high degree of cooperation in the disposition of Danish 
hogs had been attained. The greater part of the total hog production 
was exported, in the form of bacon, to England. There was already 
in existence an Agricultural Council to serve as a policy-making body.
The objects of the plan adopted were to:
a. Reduce Danish hog production to the extent necessitated by the 
British import quotas and the requirements of the domestic market.
b. Restrict exports to England in accordance with the quota.
c. Maintain the domestic bacon market at the same level as the 
British market.
The methods employed were:
a. Issuing cards to producers for numbers which the British mar­
ket and the domestic market would take.' These hogs were to be paid 
for at prices determined by the British markets.
b. Production in excess of these numbers is paid for at lower 
price.
c. Surplus pork above the demand of the British and domestic 
market is disposed of mostly abroad, but some sides are sold to hog 
producers for what they will bring.
d. Funds to subsidize the dumping of the surplus pork are raised 
by a processing tax on all hogs weighing over 110 pounds. An addi­
tional heavy fee is charged on hogs marketed without cards.
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In general the operation of the plan seems to have been successful 
in attaining its objectives. The number of hogs was already declining 
sharply before the plan was. put into effect because of the low prices 
of 1932. Further decline has been accomplished approximately to 
the levels set by the plan. A substantial number of the excess pigs 
on hand when the plan was put into effect were marketed at weights 
below 110 pounds. A large number of sows were disposed of and a 
small number of hogs have been marketed without cards. Of the pork 
that could not be sold in England or at the British price in Denmark, 
the greater part has been dumped in Belgium and the losses made up 
to the exporting bacon factories out of the special fund.
A more complete description of the plan and its operation may be 
found in a mimeographed report of the United States Department of 
Agriculture, F . S. 59. “The Operation and Results of the Hog Pro­
duction Control Plan in Denmark,” by H. E, Reed. This report was 
published in December, 1933.
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PROSPECTS FOR AGRICULTURAL RECO VERY
The following bulletins in the series “ Prospects for 
Agricultural Recovery” have been published recently by 
the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station. They may be 
obtained free upon request to the Bulletin Editor, Agri­
cultural Annex, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa.
B310 I. The Economic Situation in 1933. By Geoffrey Shep­
herd. December, 1933.
B311 II. Refinancing Farm  Mortgages in Iowa. By William I 
G. Murray. December, 1933. (This bulletin is out of | 
print.)
B312 III. Estimating Advantages of the Corn-Hog Plan to f 
the Individual Farm. By John A. Hopkins, Jr. Jan- j 
uary, 1934.
B313 IV. National Economic Planning. By Geoffrey Shep- f 
herd. January, 1934.
B314 V. Is Our Farm  Plant Too Large? By Theodore W. I 
Schultz. March, 1934.
B315 VI. Farm  Mortgage Policy. By William G. Murray. 
April, 1934.
B316 VII. Requirements for Economic Plans Affecting Agri­
culture. By John A. Hopkins, Jr. July, 1934.
B317 VIII. Who Pays for the Hog Reduction Program? By 
Geoffrey Shepherd. July, 1934.
Other recent Agricultural Economics bulletins that may 
be obtained from the Bulletin Editor are :
B318 The Destination of Iowa’s Commercial Corn. By R. C. 
Bentley. June, 1934.
B319 Improving the Domestic Market for Lard. By Rainer 
Schickele and Theodore W. Schultz. June, 1934.
B320 The Lard Market at Home and Abroad. By Rainer 
Schieckele and Theodore W. Schultz. June, 1934.
B321 Membership Problems and Relationships in Iowa Farm­
ers’ Elevators. By Frank Robotka. June, 1934.
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